Consumer Preference Not to Choose: Methodological and Policy Implications
AbstractResidential consumers remain reluctant to choose new electricity suppliers. Even the most successful jurisdictions, four U.S. states and other countries, have had to adopt extensive consumer education procedures that serve largely to confirm that choosing electricity suppliers is daunting. Electricity is not unique in this respect; numerous studies find that consumers are generally reluctant to switch brands, even when they are well-informed about product characteristics. If consumers prefer not to choose, opening regulated markets can reduce welfare, even for some consumers who do switch, as the incumbent can exploit this preference by raising price above the formerly regulated level. Policies to open markets might be successful even if limited to industrial and commercial customers, with residential prices based on those in nominally competitive wholesale markets.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-05-51.
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
electricity markets; deregulation; consumer choice; residential markets;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-01-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2006-01-24 (Energy Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salop, Steven & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977.
"Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 493-510, October.
- Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, 1977. "Bargains and ripoffs: a model of monopolistically competitive price dispersion," Special Studies Papers 94, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Flaim, Theresa, 2000. "The Big Retail "Bust": What Will It Take to Get True Competition?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 41-54, March.
- Chris M. Wilson & Catherine Waddams Price, 2005. "Irrationality in Consumers’ Switching Decisions: When More Firms May Mean Less Benefit," Industrial Organization 0509010, EconWPA.
- Littlechild, S.C., 2000. "Why We Need Electricity Retailers: A Reply to Joskow on Wholesale Spot Price pass-through," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0008, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Brennan, Timothy J., 1994. "Markets, Information, and Benevolence," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(02), pages 151-168, October.
- Zarnikau, Jay, 2005. "A review of efforts to restructure Texas' electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 15-25, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.