Legislators v. Regulators: The Case of Low Power FM Radio
AbstractThe recent Federal Communications Commission rule making for low power FM radio has been widely reported as an instance where Congress sharply rebuked the Commission for enacting rules too favorable to entrants. Because rival policy optima are quantifiable in this case, the preferences of consumers, Congress and the Commission can be directly compared. While differences in policy preferences of Congress and the regulatory agency were visible to interest groups, they appear extremely modest when compared to the open entry (welfare maximizing) policy alternative. A financial event study reveals that incumbent broadcast station equity values were neither threatened by the Commission's low power FM rules, nor materially enhanced by their reversal in Congress. This lends empirical support to the Congressional Dominance view of regulation, and illustrates the margins on which blame- and credit-shifting strategies are utilized by policy makers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Regulation2point0 in its series Working paper with number 94.
Date of creation: Feb 2002
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Web page: http://regulation2point0.org/
Other versions of this item:
- Hazlett Thomas W & Viani Bruno E, 2005. "Legislators v. Regulators: The Case of Low Power FM Radio," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-33, April.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, 1999.
"Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 397-420, Autumn.
- Steven Berry & Joel Waldfogel, 1996. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting," NBER Working Papers 5528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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