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Efficient Regulation

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  • Shleifer, Andrei

Abstract

Regulation of economic activity is ubiquitous around the world, yet standard theories predict it should be rather uncommon. I argue that the ubiquity of regulation is explained not so much by the failure of markets, or by asymmetric information, as by the failure of courts to solve contract and tort disputes cheaply, predictably, and impartially. The approach accounts for the ubiquity of regulation, for its growth over time, as well as for the fact that contracts themselves are heavily regulated. It also makes predictions, both across activities and across jurisdictions, for the efficiency of regulation and litigation as strategies of enforcing efficient conduct.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Regulation2point0 in its series Working paper with number 5.

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Date of creation: Jan 2010
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Handle: RePEc:reg:wpaper:5

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  1. Gennaioli, Nicola & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "The Evolution of Common Law," Scholarly Articles 3451305, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Oliver Hart, 2009. "Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 437-445, 05.
  4. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
  5. Anthony Niblett & Richard A. Posner & Andrei Shleifer, . "The Evolution of a Legal Rule," Working Paper 19510, Harvard University OpenScholar.
  6. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez de Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3054, The World Bank.
  7. Pierre Cahuc & Andrei Shleifer & Philippe Aghion & Yann Algan, 2009. "Regulation and Distrust," Sciences Po publications 14648, Sciences Po.
  8. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
  9. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  10. Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2009. "An Activity-Generating Theory of Regulation," NBER Working Papers 14752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Edward Glaeser & Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Coase Versus The Coasians," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 853-899, August.
  12. Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1445-1473, November.
  13. Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, 2008. "Case Law versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 379-430, 06.
  14. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8883 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2010. "The Impact of Court Errors on Liability Sharing and Safety Regulation for Environmental/Industrial Accidents," CIRANO Working Papers 2010s-48, CIRANO.
  2. Pitlik, Hans & Kouba, Ludek, 2014. "Does social distrust always lead to a stronger support for government intervention?," Ratio Working Papers 227, The Ratio Institute.
  3. Skevas, Theodoros & Fevereiro, Pedro & Wesseler, Justus, 2010. "Coexistence regulations and agriculture production: A case study of five Bt maize producers in Portugal," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2402-2408, October.
  4. Magda Bianco & Giulio Napolitano, 2011. "The Italian Administrative System: Why a Source of Competitive Disadvantage?," Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers) 24, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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