Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations
AbstractDo procedural controls placed on the regulatory process allow politicians to control bureaucratic decisionmaking? I use data on the regulatory process under the Clinton and Bush Administrations to assess the differences between these presidents with distinct ideological regulatory agendas. I find that the number of comments received, the changes made between proposal and finalization of rules, the frequency with which agencies bypass notice and comment and the time to complete a rulemaking did not vary substantially between the two presidencies. This raises questions about the effectiveness of procedural controls on agency decisionmaking.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Regulation2point0 in its series Working paper with number 436.
Date of creation: Oct 2006
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- McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-77, Fall.
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