Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Questions and Answers about the Financial Crisis

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gorton, Gary

Abstract

All bond prices plummeted (spreads rose) during the financial crisis, not just the prices of subprimerelated bonds. These price declines were due to a banking panic in which institutional investors and firms refused to renew sale and repurchase agreements (repo) – short?term, collateralized, agreements that the Fed rightly used to count as money. Collateral for repo was, to a large extent, securitized bonds. Firms were forced to sell assets as a result of the banking panic, reducing bond prices and creating losses. There is nothing mysterious or irrational about the panic. There were genuine fears about the locations of subprime risk concentrations among counterparties. This banking system (the “shadow” or “parallel” banking system) - repo based on securitization - is a genuine banking system, as large as the traditional, regulated and banking system. It is of critical importance to the economy because it is the funding basis for the traditional banking system. Without it, traditional banks will not lend and credit, which is essential for job creation, will not be created.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://regulation2point0.org/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=41
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Archive Maintainer)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Regulation2point0 in its series Working paper with number 41.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:reg:wpaper:41

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://regulation2point0.org/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2012. "Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model," CDMA Working Paper Series 201205, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
  2. Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2013. "Universal vs separated banking with deposit insurance in a macro model," Discussion Papers 1308, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  3. Christopher Kobrak & Mira Wilkins, 2011. "The '2008 Crisis' in an economic history perspective: Looking at the twentieth century," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(2), pages 175-192.
  4. Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, 2010. "The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System," IMF Working Papers 10/172, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Michael D. Bordo & John Landon-Lane, 2010. "The Lessons from the Banking Panics in the United States in the 1930s for the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008," NBER Working Papers 16365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Richard S. Grossman & Christopher M. Meissner, 2010. "International aspects of the Great Depression and the crisis of 2007: similarities, differences, and lessons," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 318-338, Autumn.
  7. Polanski, Arnold & Stoja, Evarist & Zhang, Ren, 2013. "Multidimensional risk and risk dependence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3286-3294.
  8. Chiarella, Carl & Flaschel, Peter & Hartmann, Florian & Proaño, Christian R., 2012. "Stock market booms, endogenous credit creation and the implications of broad and narrow banking for macroeconomic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 410-423.
  9. Beltratti, Andrea & Paladino, Giovanna, 2013. "Is M&A different during a crisis? Evidence from the European banking sector," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5394-5405.
  10. Sylwester Kozak & Olga Teplova, 2012. "Securitization As A Tool Of Bank Liquidity And Funding Management Before And After The Crisis: The Case Of The Eu," "e-Finanse", University of Information Technology and Management, Institute of Financial Research and Analysis, vol. 8(4), pages 30-43, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:reg:wpaper:41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Archive Maintainer).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.