To Regulate, Litigate, or Both
AbstractIn the United States insurance is regulated both by state insurance commissions and class action litigation. The interaction of these two systems has not been extensively studied. We examine four different facets of the regulation litigation tradeoff. The first is to examine whether regulator’s interest in a particular cause of action reduces the likelihood that class actions covering this cause of action will be filed in the regulator’s home state. We also examine several measures of regulatory stringency in the state to determine whether there is a substitution effect between regulatory action and litigation. We also examine whether class actions are less frequent when regulators issued an administrative decision on a particular issue previously or if there are no existing state laws on the particular issue. We examine the impact of electing judges on patterns of filing. The hypothesis is that elected judges are more sympathetic to plaintiffs and hence class actions are more likely to be filed in states that elect their judges. Lastly, we examine the impact of pervious litigation both in the state and the specific line of litigation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Regulation2point0 in its series Working paper with number 32.
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://regulation2point0.org/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2010-11-13 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2010-11-13 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-11-13 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, 2002.
"The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards,"
American Law and Economics Review,
Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 341-370.
- Helland, Eric & Tabarrok, Alex, 2002. "The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt8rm9358c, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Eric Helland & Alexander Taberrok, . "The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 1999-07, Claremont Colleges.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Archive Maintainer).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.