Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

U.S. vs. Microsoft: Did Consumers Win?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Evans, David S.
  • Nichols, Albert L.
  • Schmalensee, Richard L.

Abstract

U.S. v. Microsoft and the related state suit filed in 1998 appear to have concluded. In a unanimous en banc decision issued in late June 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected challenges to the remedies specified in a settlement reached in late 2001 and approved by the District Court in November 2002. The wave of dozens of follow-on private antitrust suits filed against Microsoft also appears to be subsiding, following many settlements and some dismissals. Related issues, however, continue to be the focus of competition agencies outside the United States, including the European Union and Korea. In this paper we review the remedies imposed in the United States, in terms of both their relationship to the violations found and their impact on consumer welfare. We conclude that the remedies addressed the violations ultimately found by the Court of Appeals (which were a subset of those found by the original district court and an even smaller subset of the violations alleged, both in court and in public discourse) and went beyond them in important ways. Thus, for those who believe that the courts were right in finding that some of Microsoft's actions harmed competition, the constraints placed on its behavior and the active, ongoing oversight by the Court and the plaintiffs provide useful protection against a recurrence of such harm. For those who believe that Microsoft should not have been found liable, because of insufficient evidence of harm to consumers, the remedies may be unnecessary, but they avoided the serious potential damage to consumer welfare that was likely to accompany the structural remedy imposed by the original district court and the more extreme restrictions on conduct later proposed by some of the state plaintiffs. The remedies imposed appear to have struck a reasonable balance between protecting consumers against the types of actions found illegal, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, avoiding excessive restrictions that would harm consumers by restricting Microsoft's ability to compete in pro-competitive ways.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://regulation2point0.org/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=109
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Archive Maintainer)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Regulation2point0 in its series Working paper with number 109.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:reg:wpaper:109

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://regulation2point0.org/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  2. Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200803, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  3. Joshua Wright, 2011. "Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 38(4), pages 387-404, June.
  4. Takanori Adachi & Takeshi Ebina & Makoto Hanazono, 2011. "Option Package Bundling," KIER Working Papers 785, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft case: unilateral effects, simulation models and econometrics in contemporary merger control," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 157, University of Duisburg-Essen, Faculty for Economics and Business Administration.
  6. Oliver Budzinski & Isabel Ruhmer, 2008. "Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200807, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  7. Cerquera Dussán, Daniel, 2006. "Dynamic R&D incentives with network externalities," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-94, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:reg:wpaper:109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Archive Maintainer).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.