Wages, Job Queues, and Skills
AbstractWe study the relationship between wages and the number and quality of applicants that a vacancy attracts. Using data from a large US employment website, we show that higher wages attract better applicants. Surprisingly, higher wages are associated with fewer applications, and this is robust to controlling for industry and occupation fixed effects. Only within specific job titles are higher wages associated with more applications. Our theoretical model shows that such a pattern is consistent with skills demanded by firms being highly job specific. The model has additional testable implications about rent sharing and unemployment rates by skill.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2012 Meeting Papers with number 592.
Date of creation: 2012
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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- Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2010.
"Applications and Interviews: A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search,"
tecipa-418, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2010. "Applications and Interviews: A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search," IZA Discussion Papers 5416, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2011. "Applications and Interviews - A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search," CESifo Working Paper Series 3317, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2011. "Applications and Interviews. A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search," Working Papers 2011.86, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Ronald Wolthoff, 2010. "Applications and Interviews: A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search," 2010 Meeting Papers 114, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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