Foreign Debt and the Ricardian Equivalence
AbstractThis paper shows that Bulow and Rogoff's "no sovereign lending" result does not apply in non-Ricardian economies. When a government strictly prefers debt-based to tax-based funding, an endogenous cost arises, prompting the government to repay. More accurately, a government which does not have enough tools to reach the first best (in which the Ricardian equivalence holds), cannot afford to redistribute the gains from default, and therefore net losses to agents will emerge in the economy. Finally, when foreign debt levels are small, the gains of default do not balance these losses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2012 Meeting Papers with number 412.
Date of creation: 2012
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