Selection and Incentives: Optimal Taxation with Occupational Choice and Private Information
AbstractThis paper examines optimal taxation of capital and labor income in a dynamic model with occupational choice.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2012 Meeting Papers with number 213.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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Other versions of this item:
- Stefania Albanesi, 2008. "Selection and Incentives: Optimal Taxation with Occupational Choice and Private Information," 2008 Meeting Papers 234, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2013-01-07 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2013-01-07 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
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