Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andrzej Skrzypacz

    (Stanford GSB)

  • Simon Board

    (UCLA)

Abstract

We consider a seller who wishes to sell K goods by time T. Potential buyers enter IID over time and are forward-looking, so can strategically time their purchases. At any point in time, profit is maximized by awarding the good to the agent with the highest valuation exceeding a cutoff. These cutoffs are characterized by a one-period-look-ahead rule and are deterministic, depending only on the number of units and time remaining. The cutoffs decrease over time and in the inventory size, and are independent of the buyers' arrival times. In the continuous time limit, the seller's profits are maximized by posting anonymous prices, with an auction for the last unit at time T. Unlike the cutoffs, the optimal prices depend on the history of past sales.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2011 Meeting Papers with number 87.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed011:87

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Fax: 1-314-444-8731
Email:
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Qingmin Liu & Konrad Mierendorff & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Auctions with Limited Commitment," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics tecipa-504, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Hao Li & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "Discriminatory Information Disclosure," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics tecipa-497, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. Zhiguo He & Gregor Matvos, 2012. "Debt and Creative Destruction: Why Could Subsidizing Corporate Debt be Optimal?," NBER Working Papers 17920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Raphael Boleslavsky & Maher Said, 2013. "Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 1-34.
  5. Mustafa Dogan_, 2014. "Product Upgrades and Posted Prices," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  6. Philippe Choné & Romain De Nijs & Lionel Wilner, 2012. "Intertemporal Pricing with Unobserved Consumer Arrival Times," Working Papers, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique 2012-23, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  7. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp662, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  8. Li, Juan & Tang, Ou, 2012. "Capacity and pricing policies with consumer overflow behavior," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 825-832.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed011:87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.