Bear Raids and Short Sale Bans: Is Government Intervention Justifiable?
Abstractincur signiﬁcant trading losses in the process. We ﬁnd that for a large enough existing stake, the value of ensuring the right decision oﬀsets these trading losses. However, when his existing stake is inadequate, short sellers succeed in destroying value. Whether this justiﬁes intervention depends on the expected value loss from ineﬃcient decisions versus the costs of intervention.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 165.
Date of creation: 2010
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