Dynamic Screening: A Role for Up-or-Out Contracts
AbstractWe analyze a dynamic principal-agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent's effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and show that they display short-term commitment to employment when the impact of effort on output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment encourages agents to exert effort, and thus improves on the principal's ability to identify their talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2005 Meeting Papers with number 766.
Date of creation: 2005
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-01 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jonathan Levin, 2002. "A Theory of Partnerships," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000002, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Waldman, Michael, 1990.
"Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-50, April.
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