Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids in Treasury Auctions
AbstractUsing data on Government of Canada securities auctions, this paper shows that in countries where direct access to primary debt issuance is restricted to government securities dealers, "order-flow" information is potentially the key source of private information for these security dealers. "Order-flow" information is revealed to a security dealer through his interactions with customers, who can place bids in the auctions only through the security dealer. Since each dealer interacts with a different set of customers, they, in effect, see different portions of the market demand and supply curves, leading to differing private inferences of where the equilibrium price might lie. We document several pieces of evidence consistent with the strategic response of dealers and customers to the presence of valuable information in their interactions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 50.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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electricity markets; multi-unit auctions; learning;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-02 (All new papers)
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- Ali Hortacsu & Jakub Kastl, 2008. "Testing for Common Values in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions," Discussion Papers 07-053, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
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