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Marques de distribution et rapports de force entre producteurs et distributeurs

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Author Info
Caprice, S.
Abstract

The analysis of the allocation of market power between producers and retailers can not be dissociated from possible switch between brands within store or between stores within brand. The product line differentiation between retailers may then be the result from this allocation of market power between upstream and downstream firms. We determine conditions for which a manufacturer competing with store brands restricts its sales on one retailer or, on the contrary, uses all channels of sale. ...French Abstract : L'analyse des rapports de force entre l'amont et l'aval ne peut être dissociée des éventuels reports de consommation entre produits ou entre enseignes de distribution lorsqu'un produit vient à manquer chez un distributeur. La différenciation entre distributeurs par la gamme de produits offerts peut alors être le résultat de ces rapports de force. L'auteur détermine les conditions sous lesquelles un producteur concurrencé par des marques de distribution a intérêt à concentrer ses débouchés ou au contraire à diversifier ses débouchés.

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File URL: http://www.toulouse.inra.fr/centre/esr/wpRePEc/cap200118.pdf
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Paper provided by French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse) in its series Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) with number 29.

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Length: 39 p.
Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:rea:inrawp:29

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Keywords: VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS STORE BRAND PRODUCT LINE DIFFERENTIATION MARKET POWER DISCRIMINATION MARQUE DE DISTRIBUTEUR DIFFERENCIATION DES PRODUITS RELATION INDUSTRIE DISTRIBUTION

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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  1. Comanor, W.S. & Rey, P., 1995. "Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors," Papers 9537, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
  2. Caprice, S., 2001. "Faut-il ou non interdire la discrimination ?," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 27, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
  3. Allain, M.-L., 1999. "The Balance of Power Between Producers and Retailers: a Differentiation Model," Papers 9917, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
  4. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1996. "Product line competition in vertically differentiated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 389-414, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mills, David E, 1995. "Why Retailers Sell Private Labels," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(3), pages 509-28, Fall.
  6. Bontems, Philippe & Monier-Dilhan, Sylvette & Requillart, Vincent, 1999. "Strategic Effects of Private Labels," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 147-65, June.
  7. Gilbert, Richard J & Matutes, Carmen, 1993. "Product Line Rivalry with Brand Differentiation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(3), pages 223-40, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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