We study how the stability of rational expectations equilibrium may be affected by monetary policy when agents learn using adaptive learning (E-stability concept) and the cost channel of monetary policy matters. We focus on both instrumental taylor-type rules and optimal rules. We show, analytically, that standard instrument rules -contemporaneous and forecast based rules - can easily induce indeterminacy and expectational instability when the cost channel is present. Overall, a naive application of the Taylor principle in this setting could be misleading. Regarding optimal rules, we find that "expectational-based" rules, under discretion and commitment, do not always induce determinate and E-stable equilibrium. This result stands in contrast to the findings of Evans and Honkapohja (2003) for for the baseline “New Keynessian" model.
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Paper provided by Banco Central de Reserva del Perú in its series Working Papers with number
2007-014.
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