Do Employees Care About Their Relative Position? Behavioural Evidence Focusing on Performance
AbstractDo employees care about their relative (economic) position among co-workers in an organization? And if so, does it raise or lower their performance? Behavioral evidence on these important questions is rare. This paper takes a novel approach to answering these questions, working with sports data from two different disciplines, basketball and soccer. These sports tournaments take place in a controlled environment defined by the rules of the game. We find considerable support that positional concerns and envy reduce individual performance. In contrast, there does not seem to be any tolerance for income disparity, based on the hope that such differences signal that better times are under way. Positive behavioral consequences are observed for those who are experiencing better times.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology in its series School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series with number 231.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jun 2008
Date of revision: 16 Jun 2008
Relative income; positional concerns; envy; social comparison; relative derivation; performance;
Other versions of this item:
- Benno Torgler & Markus Schaffner & Sascha L. Schmidt & Bruno S. Frey, 2008. "Do Employees Care about their Relative Position? Behavioural Evidence Focusing on Performance," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-12, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2008-06-27 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2008-06-27 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-SOC-2008-06-27 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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