This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Tax Morale after the Reunification of Germany: Results from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Lars P. Feld
Benno Torgler

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper provides a comparison of tax morale between inhabitants of East and West Ger¬many in its post-reunification period, using three World Values Survey/European Values Sur¬vey waves between 1990 and 1999. German reunification is particularly inter¬esting for the ana¬¬ly¬sis of tax morale as it is close to a natural experiment. Many factors can be controlled be¬¬cause they are similar, as, e.g., a common language, similar education systems and a shared cultural and political history prior to the separation after the Second World War. As a conse¬quence, an East-West comparison has a methodological advantage compared to cross-country studies. Our findings show higher tax morale in East than in West Germany. However, in only 9 years after reunification, tax morale values strongly converged, especially due to a strong change in the level of tax morale in the East. We suggest that this convergence in tax morale between East and West Germany, despite efforts of the federal government to increase de¬terrence, indicates that tax morale is more strongly driven by other factors than deterrence.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.bus.qut.edu.au/faculty/schools/economics/documents/discussionPapers/2007/Final%20DP%20209.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology in its series School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series with number 209.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 41
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qut:dpaper:209

Note: Lars P. Feld, University of Heidelberg, Alfred-Weber-Institute, Chair of Public Economics, Grabengasse 14, D-69117 Heidelberg, University, Germany, email: lars.feld@awi.uni-heidelberg.de. Benno Torgler, The School of Economics and Finance, Level 8, Z Block, Gardens Point Campus, 2 George Street, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia, email: benno.torgler@qut.edu.au. We would like to thank Andreas Schmidt (University of Cologne) for valuable research assistance in coll¬ecting the data on fines and auditing in (West and East) Germany, and Birger Nerré, Doris Aebi, Jan Schnellenbach, and partici¬pants of the 2006 National Tax Association Conference in Boston for helpful comments and suggestions.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: GPO Box 2434, BRISBANE QLD 4001
Email:
Web page: http://www.bus.qut.edu.au/faculty/schools/economics/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Dr Vlad Pavlov).

Related research
Keywords: Tax Morale; Tax Evasion; Deterrence; Quasi-Natural Experiment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bruno Frey & Lars Feld, 2002. "Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Paldam, Martin & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2000. "Missing social capital and the transition in Eastern Europe," Working Papers 00-5, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 455-483, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dubin, Jeffrey A & Graetz, Michael J & Wilde, Louis L, 1987. "Are We a Nation of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence on Tax Compliance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 240-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Elffers, Henk & Weigel, Russell H. & Hessing, Dick J., 1987. "The consequences of different strategies for measuring tax evasion behavior," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 311-337, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Annette Mummert & Friedrich Schneider, 2001. "The German Shadow Economy: Parted in a United Germany?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(3), pages 286-, July.
  8. Pommerehne, Werner W & Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1996. " Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(1-2), pages 161-70, July.
  9. Jennifer Hunt, 2000. "Why Do People Still Live in East Germany?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 201, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, 2006. "Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp286, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jan Schnellenbach, 2006. "Tax Morale and the Taming of Leviathan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 117-132, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Torgler, Benno, 2005. "Tax morale and direct democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 525-531, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Lars Feld & Bruno Frey, 2000. "Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Frey, Bruno S, 1997. "A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1043-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998. "Tax Compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Ockenfels, Axel & Weimann, Joachim, 1999. "Types and patterns: an experimental East-West-German comparison of cooperation and solidarity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 275-287, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Spicer, M W & Lundstedt, S B, 1976. "Understanding Tax Evasion," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 31(2), pages 295-305.
  19. Torgler, Benno, 2006. "The importance of faith: Tax morale and religiosity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 81-109, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2006. "Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-10, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Posner, Eric A, 1998. "Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 765-98, June.
  22. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Feld, Lars P & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2002. "Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2), pages 197-222.
  24. Joel Slemrod, 2002. "Trust in Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 9187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You may want to explore EconPapers, which displays the same data as IDEAS in a different way.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.