On Skill Heterogeneity, Human Capital, and Inflation
AbstractThis paper examines the welfare costs of inflation within a monetary dynamic general equilibrium framework with human capital that incorporates endogenous, ex ante skill heterogeneity among workers. Numerical experiments indicate that, overall, welfare costs are more likely to decrease with increases in skill heterogeneity. An implication of this feature is that a greater degree of skill heterogeneity may be associated with a higher tolerance for inflation, consequently implying a positive correlation between agent heterogeneity and inflation. Using a panel of several countries we empirically test this proposition. Our evidence lends some support to this hypothesis.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology in its series School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series with number 205.
Date of creation: 15 Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Radhika Lahiri & Elisabetta Magnani, 2007. "On Skill Heterogeneity, Human Capital, and Inflation," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 393-394, August.
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-02-17 (Central Banking)
- NEP-HRM-2007-02-17 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MAC-2007-02-17 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alex Cukierman & Steven Webb, 1995.
"Political Influence on the Central Bank- International Evidence,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
114, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
- Cukierman, A. & Webb, S., 1994. "Political Influence on the Central Bank : International Evidence," Discussion Paper 1994-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Jim Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman & Mark A. Wynne, 2000.
"Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 271-287, February.
- Jim Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman & Mark A. Wynne, 1997. "Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence," Working Papers 9705, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Saint-Paul, G. & Verdier, T., 1991.
"Education, Democracy and growth,"
DELTA Working Papers
91-27, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Angela Fletcher).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.