Uncovered Bargaining Solutions
AbstractAn uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and strict relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered bargaining solutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 608.
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Bargaining; Tournaments; Uncovered set; Non-convex problems;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
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- Michele Lombardi, 2008. "Uncovered set choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 271-279, August.
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