Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Two-stage Bargaining Solutions

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paola Manzini

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

  • Marco Mariotti

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

Abstract

We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a particular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica, 1997) of an extension of the Nash axioms and solution to domains including non-convex problems, as well as a complete characterizations of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality, Covariance with positive affine transformations, and Independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk/papers/doc/wp572.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 572.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp572

Note: A revised version is available at the personal homepage of Paola Manzini .
Contact details of provider:
Postal: London E1 4NS
Phone: +44 (0) 20 7882 5096
Fax: +44 (0) 20 8983 3580
Web page: http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Bargaining; Non-convex problems; Nash bargaining solution;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 462-472, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems," CCES Discussion Paper Series 42, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp572. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nick Vriend).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.