Schelling's Spatial Proximity Model of Segregation Revisited
AbstractSchelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We examine the robustness of Schelling's model, focusing in particular on its driving force: the individual preferences. We show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics will lead to segregation. What is more, we argue that the one-dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Schelling's spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 487.
Date of creation: Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Neighborhood segregation; Myopic Nash Equilibria; Best-response dynamics; Markov chain; Limit-behavior;
Other versions of this item:
- Pancs, Romans & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2007. "Schelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 1-24, February.
- Romans Pancs & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2003. "Schelling's Spatial Proximity Model of Segregation Revisited," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 63, Society for Computational Economics.
- Romans Pancs & Nicolaas J. Vriend, . "Schelling's Spatial Proximity Model of Segregation Revisited," Modeling, Computing, and Mastering Complexity 2003 15, Society for Computational Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-01-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2003-01-19 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2003-01-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-URE-2003-01-19 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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