The effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model à la Mussa-Rosen (1978). When the copying technology involves a marginal cost and no fixed cost, producers act independently. In this simple framework, we highlight the trade-off between ex ante and ex post efficiency considerations (how to provide the right incentives to create whilst limiting monopoly distortions?). When the copying technology involves a fixed cost and no marginal cost, pricing decisions are interdependent. We investigate the strategic pricing game by focussing on some significant symmetric Nash equilibria.
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Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
463.
Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
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