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Does Divorce Law Matter?

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Author Info
Giulio Fella () (Queen Mary, University of London)
Paola Manzini () (Queen Mary, University of London)
Marco Mariotti () (University of Exeter)

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Abstract

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 454.

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Date of creation: Mar 2002
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Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp454

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Related research
Keywords: Bargaining Divorce Non transferability

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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  1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2007. "Public Goods, Transferable Utility and Divorce Laws," IZA Discussion Papers 2646, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Helmut Rainer, 2005. "Should We Write Prenuptial Contracts?," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 0514, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Marco Francesconi & Helmut Rainer & Wilbert van der Klaauw, 2007. "The Effects of In-Work Benefit Reform in Britain on Couples: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 2980, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Libertad González Luna & Tarja K. Viitanen, 2006. "The Effect of Divorce Laws on Divorce Rates in Europe," Economics Working Papers 986, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Epstein, Gil S., 2002. "Informational Cascades and Decision to Migrate," IZA Discussion Papers 445, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Sigve Tjøtta & Kjell Vaage, 2008. "Public transfers and marital dissolution," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 419-437, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2006. "Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement," Working Papers 20060506, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Christine Atteneder & Martin Halla, 2006. "Bargaining at divorce: The allocation of custody," Economics working papers 2006-18, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, revised Jan 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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