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Divide et impera: Negotiating with a Stakeholder

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Author Info
Paola Manzini (Queen Mary, University of London)

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Abstract

In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, negotiations ought to account for the interests of such stakeholder, whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. This interplay of different interests may introduce a strategic incentive to delay agreement in order to win the maximum concessions from one's opponents.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 451.

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Date of creation: Jan 2002
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Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp451

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Related research
Keywords: Stakeholders; Bargaining; War of attrition;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining

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