Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Alliances and Negotiations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paola Manzini

    (Queen Mary, University of London)

  • Marco Mariotti

    (University of Exeter)

Abstract

A characteristic of many bargaining situations is that the negotiators represents the interests of a set of parties (trade unions, political parties, etc.) with composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances, and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the composite player affect the bargaining outcome. In particular we find that unanimity procedures lead to `more aggressive' behaviour than majority procedures, and that procedures which introduce minimum safeguards for the members of an alliance may result in agreements that are worse than without those safeguards.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk/papers/doc/wp424.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 424.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp424

Contact details of provider:
Postal: London E1 4NS
Phone: +44 (0) 20 7882 5096
Fax: +44 (0) 20 8983 3580
Web page: http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Alliances; Multiperson bargaining;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2002. "The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 490-499, December.
  2. Binmore, Ken & Osborne, Martin J. & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1992. "Noncooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 179-225 Elsevier.
  3. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1997. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 825-51, November.
  4. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79967, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Alessandra Sgobbi & Carlo Carraro, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg, 2012. ""My friends: it would be an error to accept": Communication and group identity in a bargaining setting," Working Papers 1203, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  4. Philip Bond & Hülya Eraslan, 2004. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 02 Jan 2007.
  5. Kai A. Konrad & Thomas R. Cusack, 2013. "Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4071, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2009. "Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 195-203, September.
  7. Philip Bond & H�lya Eraslan, 2010. "Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 459-490.
  8. Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Laura Sour, 2005. "Group Decision-Making and Voting in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0511002, EconWPA.
  9. Suchan Chae & Paul Heidhues, 2001. "Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and The Joint Bargaining Paradox," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nick Vriend).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.