Optimal Ownership Structures in Asymmetric Joint Ventures
AbstractThis paper investigates the relation between asymmetries in the distribution of shares in joint ventures and asymmetries between the parent companies. When the joint venture and the parent companies are controlled by separate entities, we provide a simple formula to compute the optimal ownership structure. This formula is applied to various models of market interaction, showing that larger companies should have a larger fraction of shares, and so should companies whose goods are closer substitutes of the product of the joint venture, or companies who have a higher cost of transformation of the input produced by a joint venture.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 411.
Date of creation: Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Joint ventures; Strategic alliances; Ownership structure; Asymmetries;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-05-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2000-05-16 (Finance)
- NEP-MIC-2000-05-16 (Microeconomics)
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