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No Win, No Fee : Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees

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  • H. Gravelle
  • M. Waterson

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects on the litigation process of alternative contracts between plaintiffs and their lawyers. Three contracts are compared: normal (hourly fee), contingent mark up fees, and contingent share contracts. The focus is on the first two, a recent change in English law governing legal fees providing the motivation. The influences of the contract type on the acceptance of settlement offers, the settlement probability, the accident probability, the demand for trials, and the ex ante and ex post welfare of litigants are examined. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.
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Suggested Citation

  • H. Gravelle & M. Waterson, 1992. "No Win, No Fee : Some Economics of Contingent Legal Fees," Working Papers 254, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:254
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