We extend the Coase conjecture to the case of a seller with a single object, who faces n potential buyers and holds a sequence of English auctions until the object is sold. In an independent-private-values environment in which buyers and sellers share the same discount factor, we show that the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium path of reserve prices obeys a Coasian logic. Moreover, the equilibrium reserve path lies below that for the model of repeated sealed-bid, second-price auctions studied by McAfee and Vincent (1997). Nevertheless, the open (English) and sealed-bid formats are shown to be revenue equivalent.
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Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia in its series Discussion Papers Series with number
349.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994.
"Sequentially Optimal Auctions,"
Discussion Papers
1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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