The Geographical Allocation Pattern of Spanish Official Development Assistance
AbstractThe geographical allocation of Spanish aid has been little studied, despite the fact that it is unusually concentrated on middle-income countries. This paper sets out a model of Spanish ODA policy based on an integrated approach reflecting recipient needs and donor interests with an aim of analysing the 'censored' nature of aid-partner selection and quota allocation. The results show that Spain has followed a hybrid pattern involving recipient needs, but where self-interest predominates and performance criteria, such as recipient governance and adsorptive capacity, are absent. Spain has differentiated two distributional patterns in terms of its geographical preferences and has carried out a balanced strategy between altruist motivations and foreign policy interests with its former colonies. This insufficient progressiveness of allocation is due mainly to the influence of the post-colonial links ?although these links have characterized the allocation patterns of all donor countries that were once colonial metropolises
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