Randomization with Asymmetric Information a Simplified Exposition
AbstractA series of recent papers investigated the desirability of randomization of insurance contracts in the presence of moral hazard. All treat a continuum of possible outcomes, which tends to obscure the intuition. In this paper, we treat the two-outcome case, employing derivations which highlight the intuition. We also discuss randomization with adverse selection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 594.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1985
Date of revision:
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