Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard
AbstractThis paper examines the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in economies with moral hazard. The nature of competitive equilibrium depends on whether insurers can observe an insured's total purchases of insurance. If insurers can observe this, an individual will purchase all his insurance from a single agent, and the contract will specify the price but also ration the quantity. If insurers cannot observe this, then a competitive equilibrium may not exist. Equilibrium may be characterized by random insurance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 483.
Date of creation: 1982
Date of revision:
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- Hadi Dowlatabadi, 2007. "On integration of policies for climate and global change," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 12(5), pages 651-663, June.
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