Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard: Basic Analytics
AbstractThis paper is the first in a series. Among the results are: 1) Indifference curves between premiums and payouts are not generally quasi-concave; as a result the price- and income-consumption lines are generally not continuous; 2) Accident prevention effort is generally not continuous or monotonic in the parameters of the insurance contract; 3) The set of feasible insurance contracts, is not generally convex.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 465.
Date of creation: 1982
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