This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Anita Anand (University of Toronto)
Frank Milne () (Queen's University)
Lynnette Purda (Queen's University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We model firms' incentives to voluntarily adopt corporate governance mechanisms and hypothesize that management's ability to extract private benefits, the need for external funds, and the ease with which a firm's assets may be monitored are important determinants of the level of governance. Using hand-collected data, we test these hypotheses and examine firms' propensity to adopt recommended but not required governance standards from their home and neighboring country's jurisdictions. We document that a significant level of voluntary adoption occurs and that this level has been both increasing over time and declining in variability across firms. Governance mechanisms are least likely to be voluntarily implemented when management controls a significant portion of common stock votes or a majority owner exists. In contrast, voluntary adoption increases when the firm faces significant investment opportunities and employs large levels of expenditures which are difficult to monitor such as research and development expenses.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_1112.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version 2006
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1112.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:1112

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6
Phone: (613) 533-2250
Fax: (613) 533-6668
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.queensu.ca/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Mark Babcock).

Related research
Keywords: Corporate Governance Empirial Finance

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Randall Morck & Michael Percy & Gloria Tian & Bernard Yeung, 2004. "The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm - A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada," NBER Working Papers 10635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 537-600, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Corporate Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 1-35, January.
    Other versions:
  4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Campbell, John Y, 1996. "Understanding Risk and Return," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(2), pages 298-345, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Erik BERGLÖF & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1999. "The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm : Implications for Transition and Developing Countries," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9912, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 107-155, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Art Durnev & Larry Fauver, 2007. "Stealing from Thieves: Firm Governance and Performance when States are Predatory," CEI Working Paper Series 2008-12, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use IDEAS to provide links to papers and articles in your course syllabus.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.