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Optimal Contracts Costly State Falsificaion

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Author Info
LACKER, J.M.
WEINBERG, J.A.

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Abstract

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Download Info
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 930.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:930

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Related research
Keywords: risk contracts insurance employment

Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-5.

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