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Optimal Contracts Costly State Falsificaion Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics LACKER, J.M.
WEINBERG, J.A.
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Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number
930.
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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: 1988Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:930Contact details of provider: Postal: Krannert Building, West Lafayette, IN 47907 Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: risk ; contracts ; insurance ; employment ;
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-28.
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