A Blotto Game with Multi-Dimensional Incomplete Information
AbstractIn the Colonel Blotto game, each of two players simultaneously allocates his fixed budget of a resource across a finite number n of battle elds. Within each battlefield, the player that allocates the higher level of the resource wins the battlefield. Each player's payoff is equal to the sum of the values of the battlefields he wins. In this paper we examine a multi-dimensional incomplete information version of the Colonel Blotto game in which each player's n-tuple of battlefield valuations is drawn from a common n-variate joint distribution function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1262.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Colonel Blotto Game; Con ict; Multi-dimensional Incomplete Information; Multi-dimensional Action Space;
Other versions of this item:
- Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2011. "A Blotto game with multi-dimensional incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 273-275.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-09-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2011-09-22 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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