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Microfoundations for the Linear Demand Product Differentiation Model, with Applications

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  • Stephen Martin

Abstract

This paper shows (1) that the Spence-Dixit-Vives model of linear demand for differentiated varieties is implied if supplies of substitutes reduce individual consumers' reservation prices as indicated in the paper, (2) that for the micro-foundation-based version SDV demand and endogenous sunk costs, the equilibrium number of varieties is independent of the number of consumers in the market and the marginal cost of a variety of unit quality, and (3) that with endogenous sunk cost, if demand does not expand with the number of varieties (as in the SDV model), the equilibrium number of varieties is unchanged, but equilibrium qualities and quantities purchased are less, all else equal.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen Martin, 2009. "Microfoundations for the Linear Demand Product Differentiation Model, with Applications," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1221, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1221
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    File URL: https://business.purdue.edu/research/Working-papers-series/2009/1221.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Friebel, Guido & Raith, Michael, 2016. "Managers, Training, and Internal Labor Markets," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145666, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Dimitrios Varvarigos & Eleni Stathopoulou, 2023. "On the relation between corruption and market competition," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(1), pages 99-121, January.
    3. Koichi Kagitani & Takao Ohkawa & Makoto Okamura, 2016. "Does the Excess Entry Theorem Hold in a Differentiated Oligopoly?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 84(3), pages 340-362, June.
    4. Stephen Martin & Jan Vandekerckhove, 2010. "Market Performance Implications of the Transfer Price Rule," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1238, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    5. Raúl Bajo-Buenestado & Dodge Cahan, 2015. "Unification of Oligopolistic Markets for a Homogeneous Good in the Presence of an Antitrust Commission," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 239-256, September.
    6. Belleflamme, Paul & Toulemonde, Eric, 2016. "Who benefits from increased competition among sellers on B2C platforms?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 741-751.
    7. Fabrizi, Simona & Lippert, Steffen & Puppe, Clemens & Rosenkranz, Stephanie, 2016. "Manufacturer suggested retail prices, loss aversion and competition," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 141-153.
    8. Cumbul, Eray & Virág, Gábor, 2018. "Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 250-273.
    9. Malcolm Brady, 2022. "Asymmetric Horizontal Differentiation under Advertising in a Cournot Duopoly," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-14, May.
    10. Quan Zheng & Xiajun Amy Pan & Asoo J. Vakharia, 2020. "Common Retailer Channel Revisited: The Role of Supply Network Size," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(9), pages 2175-2181, September.
    11. Liu, Bingbing & Yu, Yugang & Guo, Xiaolong, 2021. "Simpler and better: Supply chain contracting in the presence of contract unobservability and upstream competition," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    12. Neelanjan Sen & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2023. "When to merge with a lower quality producer?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 138(2), pages 165-188, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    product differentiation; micro foundations; oligopoly; Cournot; endogenous sunk cost;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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