This paper studies secrecy in voting on corporate governance issues and finds evidence that supports the coalition building hypothesis and, in part, rejects the agency cost hypothesis. The conditions for insiders and large outsiders to form coalitions are examined. The results are consistent with insiders and large outsiders cooperating and voting as a block to maintain power; this imposes costs on other shareholders. Consistent with the agency theory and the coalition building theory, management initiated amendments have a more negative impact that shareholder initiated amendments. No evidence is found to support the vote your conscience theory on secret voting.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.