The Determinants of Portuguese Banks’ Capital Buffers
AbstractThe purpose of the present paper is to shed some light on why Portuguese banks hold significant capital buffers above the required regulatory minimum, through the estimation of a dynamic panel data model. The main findings are that the capital buffer is positively influenced by several broad risk measures, suggesting that the introduction of the more sensitive regulation in Basel II might not affect Portuguese banks’ capital ratios as much as one could expect. Provisions and high and stable profitability are found to be substitutes for capital buffers, whereas larger banks seem to hold less excess capital. A negative business cycle effect is also found, and several other hypotheses are tested.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department in its series Working Papers with number w200801.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
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