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Competing Auctions with Heterogeneous Goods

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  • Cristian Troncoso-Valverde

    ()
    (Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales)

Abstract

This paper studies a model of competing auctions in which bidders attach different valuations to the items offered by sellers. We provide a novel characterization of the set of (symmetric) participation rules used by bidders and show that contrary to models with homogeneous goods, heterogeneity rules out randomization when bidders choose trading partners. We also show that changes in some reserve price alter the participation decision of every buyer regardless of her valuation of the item. This implies that such changes not only affect the distribution of valuations of those buyers participating in a given auction but also modify the probability with which every buyer visits the auctions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales in its series Working Papers with number 46.

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Date of creation: Dec 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ptl:wpaper:46

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  1. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
  2. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  3. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "Participation constraints in the vickrey auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 31-36.
  4. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2005. "Competition among auctioneers in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 107-127, March.
  5. Vagstad, Steinar, 2007. "Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 597-614, June.
  6. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
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