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Social consistency and individual rationality

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Antoine Billot

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Abstract

This paper aims at proving that social interactions can easily be rationalized by individual preferences as defined in standard microeconomic theory. For that purpose, we show individual choice rationality to be logically equivalent to social consistency, when individual rationality means that individual preferences are completely ordered and social consistency that there is a one-to-one mapping between a given family of social communities and the existence of a particular (unique, reflexive and symmetric) interaction relation between individuals. Moreover, continuity and monotonicity of individual preferences are shown to fit the modeling of group loyalty when group loyalty is defined as the ability to freely accept a personal loss for the global gain of a particular population.

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Paper provided by PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series PSE Working Papers with number 2007-14.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pse:psecon:2007-14

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  1. George A. Akerlof, 1997. "Social Distance and Social Decisions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1005-1028, September.
  2. Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2001. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 500-528, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Topa, Giorgio, 2001. "Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(2), pages 261-95, April.
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  4. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Glaeser, Edward L & Sacerdote, Bruce & Scheinkman, Jose A, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 507-48, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Stephen Morris, . ""Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching''," CARESS Working Papres 97-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  7. P. Mongin, 1998. "Does optimization imply rationality ?," THEMA Working Papers 98-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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  8. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1998. "The social basis of interdependent preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 779-800, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78, January.
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  10. Billot, Antoine, 2003. " How Liberalism Kills Democracy or Sen's Theorem Revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 247-70, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Manski, Charles F, 1993. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(3), pages 531-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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