On étudie et compare deux cas d'incertitude qui ont abouti à des arguments de référence en faveur de moins d'activisme de la politique économique. L'un , comme dans Brainard (1967), où cette incertitude porte sur l'effet global de la politique; et l'autre, comme dans Friedman (1960) pour la politique monétaire, où elle porte sur ses délais d'action. On montre qu'une approche bayésienne de l'incertitude (qu'utilise Brainard) donne des résultats similaires dans les deux cas, mais que ce n'est que dans le cas d'une incertitude portant sur les délais d'action qu'une approche de l'incertitude en termes de robustesse (critère du minimax) conduit nécessairement à moins d'activisme. De plus, dans ce cas, l'activisme de la politique robuste est encore plus faible que ce que donnerait une approche bayésienne. Un critère de robustesse donne donc tout son poids à l'argument en termes d'incertitude sur les délais d'action de Friedman. ### [english abstract: We study and compare two cases of uncertainty which have led to traditional arguments for less activist economic policies. One, as in Brainard (1967), where the uncertainty concerns the global effect of policy; and the other, as in Friedman (1960) for monetary policy, where the uncertainty is about the the lags of the effect of policy. We show that a bayesian approach of uncertainty (which is used by Brainard) leads to similar results in both cases, but that it is only in the case of uncertainty about lags that an approach in terms of robustness (through a minimax criterion) necessarily leads to less activism. Moreover, in that case, the robust policy is even less activist than what a bayesian approach would give. Therefore, a robustness criterion gives its full weight to Friedman's argument relying on uncertainty about the lags of policy.] ###
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Paper provided by PSE (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series PSE Working Papers with number
2006-04.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Glenn Rudebusch & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999.
"Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting,"
NBER Chapters,
in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 203-262
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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