Redistribution, Inequality and Political Conflict
AbstractThis paper analyses the relationship between redistributive policies and civil unrest. This relationship is modelled in a discrete two-period recursive model. Key theoretical assumptions and outcomes are tested empirically using data for a panel of 14 major Indian states between 1973 and 2000. The analysis shows that, in the medium-term, redistributive policies have been significantly more effective in reducing civil unrest in India than more direct solutions, such as the use of police and military forces, and have resulted in important positive externalities on economic growth. This represents an important lesson for countries where social cohesion tends to break frequently but large-scale wars may be avoidable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Poverty Research Unit at Sussex, University of Sussex in its series PRUS Working Papers with number 18.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
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Redistribution; conflict; inequality; economic growth; India; panel data;
Other versions of this item:
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- O53 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
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