The main goal of this paper is to examine the implications of firm-oriented fiscal policies, such as capital subsidies and tax allowances, in an economy with an underground sector. In addition, we investigate whether the technology structure of “hidden” production may facilitate or counteract the effects of fiscal policies on firm behavior. Among our results we stress the following: first, capital subsidies promote tax evasion; these subsidies induce firms to increase actual capital accumulation (a level effect), but also produce a reduction in the regular share of aggregate capital stock (a composition effect). Second, tax relief reduces underground activities and fosters capital accumulation, as well as aggregate production. Third, the technology structure matters for determining how to allocate resources between formal and informal production, hence the amount of reported revenues.
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Paper provided by D.E.S. (Department of Economic Studies), University of Naples "Parthenope", Italy in its series Discussion Papers with number
4_2007.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E26 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Informal Economy; Underground Economy E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
James Andreoni & Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, 1998.
"Tax Compliance,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 36(2), pages 818-860, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002.
"Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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