Collective Bargaining and the Division of the Value of the Enterprise
AbstractThe enterprise (firm) is modeled as a collection of formal and informal contracts providing various factors of production with claims on the income stream in consideration of assets or services supplied to the enterprise. The strongly efficient bargaining model implies that the division of the quasi-rents will result in dollar for dollar exchanges of wealth between the union members and the shareholders. The leading inefficient bargaining models do not imply such tradeoffs in general. The model is tested by considering contract settlements during the years 1976 to 1982 as recorded by the Bureau of National Affairs in Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts. Security price data for the firms were merged with these bargaining unit level settlement data. The tests provide substantial confirmation of the dollar for dollar wealth tradeoff between union members and shareholders.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 598.
Date of creation: Jan 1987
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wage settlements; quasi-rent splitting; efficient contracting; unions and profits;
Other versions of this item:
- John M. Abowd, 1989. "Collective Bargaining and the Division of the Value of the Enterprise," NBER Working Papers 2137, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D57 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Input-Output Tables and Analysis
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
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612, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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- repec:fth:prinin:228 is not listed on IDEAS
- Janet Currie Neelin, 1989. "What Do (Public Sector) Unions Do? Wage and Employment Determination Among Ontario Public School Teachers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 542, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dorothee Schneider, 2011. "The Labor Share: A Review of Theory and Evidence," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-069, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
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