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On the Efficiency of Standard Contracts the Case of Construction Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Surajeet Chakravarty
Bentley MacLeod
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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number
874.
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Date of creation: Sep 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:874Contact details of provider: Postal: Firestone Library, Princeton, New Jersey 08544-2098 Phone: 609 258-4041 Fax: 609 258-2907 Web page: http://www.irs.princeton.edu/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: construction contracts ; structuring ; bargaining ; efficient solutions ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: N37 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Income, and Wealth - - - Africa; Oceania N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Rogerson, William P, 1992.
"Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem ,"
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Shavell, Steven, 1984.
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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William P. Rogerson, 1984.
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RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring.
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Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1999.
"Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114, January.
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Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994.
"The Management of Innovation ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209, November.
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Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986.
"Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June.
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Other versions: Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995.
"Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment ,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
1155, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
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Other versions:
Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997.
"Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment ,"
NBER Working Papers
5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996.
"Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, 1991.
"Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale ,"
NBER Working Papers
3696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
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Other versions: McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987.
"Auctions and Bidding ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
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Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978.
"Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, 1999.
"Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
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Tirole, Jean, 1986.
"Procurement and Renegotiation ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-59, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001.
"Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
Other versions: Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986.
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
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Other versions: R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986.
"Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
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Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994.
"Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-82, March.
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Edlin, Aaron S & Hermalin, Benjamin E, 2000.
"Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 395-423, October.
Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995.
"Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 163-179, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1991.
"Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 232-240, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1991.
"Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(5), pages 1031-42, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steve Tadelis, 2006.
"Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis ,"
NBER Working Papers
12051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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