References listed on IDEAS
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1. Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-33, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbritation Systems," Working papers 562, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Working Papers 647, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
   • Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," NBER Working Papers 3417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S. & Spiegel, M., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbitration Systems," Papers 55, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
2. Gibbons, Robert, 1988. "Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 896-912, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1987. "Arbitrator Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 342-46, May.
   Other versions:
   • Orley Ashenfelter, 1987. "Arbitrator Behavior," Working Papers 599, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
4. David E. Bloom & Christopher L. Cavanagh, 1986. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," NBER Working Papers 1938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Bloom, David E & Cavanagh, Christopher L, 1986. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 408-22, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, 1983. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 1149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1981. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 526, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
6. Craig A. Olson & Paul Jarley & Gregory Dell'Omo, 1992. "A comparison of interest arbitrator decision-making in experimental and field settings," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 45(4), pages 711-723, July.
7. Babcock, Linda, et al, 1995. "Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1337-43, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Robert Gibbons, 1988. "Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration," Working papers 485, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
9. Roth, Alvin E, 1991. "Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(404), pages 107-14, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Richard N. Block & Jack Stieber, 1987. "The impact of attorneys and arbitrators on arbitration awards," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 40(4), pages 543-555, July.
11. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1503-28, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    Other versions:
    • Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1934, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," NBER Working Papers 8650, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."," NBER Working Papers 2139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. repec:fth:prinin:219 is not listed on IDEAS
15. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 819-44, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 503-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," NBER Working Papers 3530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1990. "The Allocation of Talent: Implicationsfor Growth," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 65, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
17. Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 99-120, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Camerer, Colin F, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-88, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Bazerman, Max H. & Neale, Margaret A. & Valley, Kathleen L. & Zajac, Edward J. & Kim, Yong Min, 1992. "The effect of agents and mediators on negotiation outcomes," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 55-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 157-172, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, 1989. "The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation," NBER Working Papers 2418, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Alexandre Mas, 2006. "Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance," NBER Working Papers 12202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)