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Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation

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Author Info
Marianne Bertrand
Sendhil Mullainathan

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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 783.

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Date of creation: Oct 1998
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Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:783

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Keywords: executive compensation; incentives & takeover lows;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

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  1. Pound, John, 1987. "The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 353-67, October.
  2. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 2000. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages F672-94, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Szewczyk, Samuel H. & Tsetsekos, George P., 1992. "State intervention in the market for corporate control : The case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 3-23. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Gruber, Jonathan, 1994. "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 622-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, 1994. "CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures," NBER Working Papers 4976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Haubrich, Joseph G, 1994. "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 258-76, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Borokhovich, Kenneth A & Brunarski, Kelly R & Parrino, Robert, 1997. " CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1495-1517, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Malatesta, Paul H., 1989. "The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-322, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. James J. Heckman, 1989. "Choosing Among Alternative Nonexperimental Methods for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of Manpower Training," NBER Working Papers 2861, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bar-Gill, Oren & Barzuza, Michal & Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 2002. "The Market for Corporate Law," CEPR Discussion Papers 3553, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. repec:fth:prinin:431 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Girma, Sourafel & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Peter, 2002. "Merger Activity and Executive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 3255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Eric Nowak & Michael H. Haid, 1999. "Executive compensation and the susceptibility of firms to hostile takeovers. An empirical investigation of the U.S. oil industry," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 32, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. [Downloadable!]
  6. Anthony P. Thirwall, 1972. "A Cross-Section Study of Population Growth and the Growth of Output and Per Capita Income in a Production Function Framework," Working Papers 406, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jenter, Dirk, 2004. "Executive Compensation, Incentives, and Risk," Working papers 4466-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2000. "Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do," Working Papers 810, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 1998. "Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation," NBER Working Papers 6807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, 2002. "Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate," NBER Working Papers 9107, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Cohen, Alma, 2002. "Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate," CEPR Discussion Papers 3514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives," NBER Working Papers 7335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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