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Modal Choice in the Demand for Child Care by Working Women

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Kathryn E. Yaeger
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Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 485.

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Date of creation: Dec 1977
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Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:485

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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  1. Janet Currie & John Fahr, 2002. "Medicaid Managed Care: Effects on Children's Medicaid Coverage and Utilization," NBER Working Papers 8812, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Gaynor, Martin & Vogt, William B., 2000. "Antitrust and competition in health care markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 27, pages 1405-1487 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dranove, David, 1998. "Economies of scale in non-revenue producing cost centers: Implications for hospital mergers," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 69-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ashenfelter, Orley & Hannan, Timothy, 1986. "Sex Discrimination and Product Market Competition: The Case of the Banking Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 149-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Not-For-Profit Entrepreneurs," NBER Working Papers 6810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Joseph G. Altonji & Paul J. Devereux, 1999. "The Extent and Consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity," NBER Working Papers 7236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. William M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, 1997. "Monopsony in the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 86-112, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. John M. Abowd & Orley C. Ashenfelter, 1981. "Anticipated Unemployment, Temporary Layoffs, and Compensating Wage Differentials," NBER Chapters, in: Studies in Labor Markets, pages 141-186 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Sloan, Frank A., 2000. "Not-for-profit ownership and hospital behavior," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 21, pages 1141-1174 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. David M. Cutler & Jill Horwitz, 2000. "Converting Hospitals from No t-for-Profit to For-Profit Status Why and What Effects?," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Hospital Industry: Comparing For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Institutions, pages 45-90 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Ho, Vivian & Hamilton, Barton H., 2000. "Hospital mergers and acquisitions: does market consolidation harm patients?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 767-791, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Currie, Janet & Fahr, John, 2004. "Hospitals, managed care, and the charity caseload in California," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 421-442, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Brown, James N & Ashenfelter, Orley, 1986. "Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages S40-S87, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, 2000. "Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 577-615, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Edward J. Schumacher & Barry T. Hirsch, . "Compensating Differentials and Unmeasured Ability in the Labor Market For Nurses: Why Do Hospitals Pay More?," Working Papers 9604, East Carolina University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Hirsch, B.T. & Schumacher, E.J., 1993. "Monopsony Power and Relative Wages in the Labor Market for Nurses," Working Papers 1993_06_03, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
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  19. David M. Cutler & Jill R. Horwitz, 1998. "Converting Hospitals from Not-for-profit to For-profit Status," NBER Working Papers 6672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Paul F. Clark & Darlene A. Clark & David V. Day & Dennis G. Shea, 2001. "Healthcare reform and the workplace experience of nurses: Implications for patient care and union organizing," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 55(1), pages 133-148, October.
  21. Dranove, David & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 2000. "The industrial organization of health care markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 20, pages 1093-1139 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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