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Monopsony and Labor Supply in the Army and Navy

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Author Info
Beth Asch (RAND)
Paul Heaton (RAND)

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Abstract

Because it is differentiated from other employers, the U.S. military enjoys some monopsony power. After reviewing existing estimates of the elasticity of labor supplied to the military, we obtain new estimates for the Army and Navy covering the period from 1998-2007. We employ a control function approach to account for the potential endogeneity of enlistment incentives. Our elasticity estimates of 2.4 for the Army and .4 for the Navy suggest that the services have substantial wage-setting ability. However, the Army faces higher supply elasticity since the invasion of Iraq and higher elasticity in states with weak support for obligatory military service.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. in its series Working Papers with number 1107.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pri:indrel:1107

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Related research
Keywords: military; labor supply; monopsony papers;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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  1. Ransom, Michael R, 1993. "Seniority and Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 221-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Torberg Falch, 2008. "The elasticity of labor supply at the establishment level," Working Papers 1106, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sullivan, Daniel, 1989. "Monopsony Power in the Market for Nurses," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages S135-78, October.
  4. William M. Boal & Michael R. Ransom, 1997. "Monopsony in the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 86-112, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Curtis J. Simon & John T. Warner, 2007. "Managing the all-volunteer force in a time of war," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Economists for Peace and Security (UK), vol. 2(1), pages 20-29, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Asch, Beth J. & Hosek, James R. & Warner, John T., 2007. "New Economics of Manpower in the Post-Cold War Era," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Daniel Sullivan, 1989. "Monopsony Power in the Market for Nurses," NBER Working Papers 3031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Borcherding, Thomas E, 1971. "A Neglected Social Cost of a Voluntary Military," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 195-96, March.
  9. Olley, G Steven & Pakes, Ariel, 1996. "The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1263-97, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. John T. Warner, 1990. "MILITARY RECRUITING PROGRAMS DURING THE 1980s: THEIR SUCCESS AND POLICY ISSUES," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(4), pages 47-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Warner, John T., 1995. "The economics of military manpower," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 13, pages 347-398 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Aline Quester & Michael Nakada, 1983. "The Military's Monopsony Power," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 295-308, Oct-Dec. [Downloadable!]
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